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Abstract: This article provides an agent-based model of a hypothetical standalone electricity network
to identify how the feed-in tariﬀs and the installed capacity of wind power, calculated in percentage of
total system demand, aﬀect the electricity consumption from renewables. It includes the mechanism
of electricity pricing on the Day Ahead Market (DAM) and the Imbalance Market (IM). The extra
production volumes of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES-E) and the ﬂexibility of
electrical consumption of industries is provided as reserves on the IM. Five thousand simulations
were run by using the agent-based model to gather data that were then ﬁt in linear regression models.
This helped to quantify the eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs and installed capacity of wind power on the
consumption from renewable energy and market prices. The consumption from renewable sources,
expressed as percentage of total system consumption, increased by 8.17% for every 10% increase in
installed capacity of wind power. The sharpest increase in renewable energy consumption is observed
when a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh is provided to the wind farm owners, resulting in an average
increase of 9.1% and 5.1% in the consumption from renewable sources while the maximum installed
capacity of wind power is 35% and 100%, respectively. The regression model for the annualized
DAM prices showed an increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh in the DAM prices for every 10% increase in
the installed wind power capacity. With every increase of 0.01 €/kWh in the value of feed-in tariﬀs,
the mean DAM price is lowered as compared to the previous value of the feed-in tariﬀ. DAM prices
only decrease with increasing installed wind capacity when a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh is provided.
This is observed because all wind power being traded on DAM at a very cheap price. Hence, no
volume of electricity is being stored for availability on IM. The regression models for predicting IM
prices show that, with every 10% increase in installed capacity of wind power, the annualized IM
price decreases by 0.031 and 0.34 €cents/kWh, when installed capacity of wind power is between 0
and 25%, and between 25 and 100%, respectively. The models also showed that, until the maximum
installed capacity of wind power is less than 25%, the IM prices increase when the value of feed-in
tariﬀ is 0.01 and 0.04 €/kWh, but decrease for a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh. When installed
capacity of wind power is between 25 and 100%, increasing feed-in tariﬀs to the value of 0.03 €/kWh
result in lowering the mean IM price. However, at 0.04 €/kWh, the mean IM price is higher, showing
the eﬀect of no storage reserves being available on IM and more expensive reserves being engaged on
the IM. The study concludes that the eﬀect of increasing installed capacity of wind power is more
signiﬁcant on increasing consumption of renewable energy and decreasing the DAM and IM prices
than the eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs. However, the eﬀect of increasing values of both factors on the proﬁt
of RES-E producers with storage facilities is not positive, pointing to the need for customized rules
and incentives to encourage their market participation and investment in storage facilities.
Energies 2019, 12, 4314; doi:10.3390/en12224314 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies264
Energies 2019, 12, 4314
Keywords: agent-based modelling; ﬂexibility; renewable energy; electricity markets
1. Introduction
In 2017, with 17% contribution of renewables in the total energy needs, the EU was well on the
way to achieve the 2020 target of 20% renewables [1]. As the EU Renewable Energy Directive aims
to increase this number to 32% in 2030 [2], considerable investments and infrastructural changes are
needed in the European member states to accommodate renewables in the energy mix. In 2018, 26.7
billion Euros were spent alone on wind energy projects, of which 16.4 billion was spent solely on
onshore wind energy [3].
Diﬀerentmarket integration schemes and supportmechanisms have been developed for increasing
the injection of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES-E) in the grid and to restrict the
costs induced by the variability and limited predictability of RES-E generation. In liberalized power
markets, these costs occur as imbalance costs, which may be deﬁned as a penalty for deviating from the
submitted production and consumption plan [4]. In extreme cases, the unpredictable RES-E that are
protected from the market eﬀects by diﬀerent ﬁnancial incentives, like the tradable green certiﬁcates
and the feed-in tariﬀs contribute to causing a negative market price [4–6]. Investment grants, RES-E
quotas, feed-in-tariﬀs, green certiﬁcates, etc. also generate incentives to invest, which indirectly increase
competition and improve technology leading to cost reductions and volume growth [7]. Eventually,
the RES-E push the expensive systems like nuclear and gas ﬁred power plants out of the market and
lower the market price due to their negligible marginal costs. However, this increases price volatility
on the market. Extremely high prices are caused when demand peaks as compared to the supply.
Traditionally, established technologies of power production, e.g., coal-ﬁred, gas-ﬁred or nuclear
power plants, were used to provide the needed ancillary services to the grid, maintaining a safe
operation. However, since renewables have successfully entered the electricity market, the need for
system security has increased. It is estimated that, for every 8 MW of wind power installed, a 1 MW of
peaking plant is required [8], whereas, it is also estimated that most of the peaking gas units today
operate at below 20% utilization rates [9]. Use of demand side response (DSR) as a grid balancing
strategy is a recent phenomenon [10], but it shows promising potential, especially when coupled with
increased wind power injection [11]. DSR is a set of measures that uses loads, local generation, and
storage to support network operations and also to enhance the quality of power supply [12]. DSR
has been proven to reduce the needed conventional generation capacity, to maximize the low carbon
generation, to contribute to short-term system balancing and to defer the network reinforcements [13].
This article studies the eﬀect of limited generational ﬂexibility of the wind farms that receive a feed-in
tariﬀ for each kWh of renewable power they inject in the grid, against the reserves provided by the
industries and other technologies as ﬂexible demand.
Electricity grid and markets are composed of multiple actors, who are engaged in
consumption/production of electricity that fulﬁll their own needs and businesses. Their interactions
via the market and the electricity grid results in impacting the consumption/production pattern of
each other. Agent-based modelling allows to mimic the behavior of human beings and simulate
production, consumption and bidding processes, in which participants are modeled as adaptive agents
with diﬀerent strategies [14]. Agent-Based Models (ABMs) have been used to model the diﬀusion of
energy eﬃcient technologies through the society by the interaction of diﬀerent agents [15,16]. ABMs
are used to explore possible states of a system to understand plausible futures, trends, tendencies, and
behaviors that can occur under speciﬁc circumstances [17].
Previous work on the use of ABMs for electricity grids, markets, and the injection of renewables
have focused on the eﬀect of prosumption and peer to peer supply and its eﬀect on the grid
management [18] and grid design strategies [19]. ABMs have also been used to predict price of energy
trading in smart grids by the use of incomplete information by diﬀerent agents to optimize their
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own utility [20]. Likewise, they have been employed as an e-laboratory to test diﬀerent regulatory
interventions before implementation [21]. Furthering the investigation on the proﬁt RES-E producers,
ABM has been used to study the optimum conditions for the wind power producers participating in a
deregulated market with the inclusion of learning algorithms to optimize the bidding process [14].
Similarly, the technique has been employed to investigate the eﬀect of storage possibilities in the form
of electric vehicles on the proﬁt of wind farms that engage in the electricity markets [22]. Based on
the above-mentioned examples of application of ABMs for decision-making, technology diﬀusion,
and market price calculation, the data for analysis were generated by an ABM that was developed
speciﬁcally for this study.
1.1. Electricity Markets and Grid Balancing
Energy system ﬂexibility is not a technological issue alone; it has a strong link to the energy
markets as well [23]. Balancing the potential supply and demand of electricity at any given time
ensures a reliable supply of electricity. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are entrusted to carry
out the necessary security checks and real-time operations of ensuring a smooth supply of electricity to
the consumers [6]. To make this possible, the majority of electricity trade is conducted up to one day
before delivery. Based on the time dimension, energy trade is divided into diﬀerent markets in Europe.
In this article, a Day Ahead Market (DAM) and an Imbalance Market (IM) are modeled based on the
principles of the same markets in Belgium [24,25]. To ensure more transparent market pricing system,
in both markets, buyers and sellers trade electricity following an energy exchange. For the DAM, the
intersection of scheduled production and consumption proﬁles provide the market prices for each
hour of the next day, as shown in Figure 1a. The RES-E technologies have the lowest marginal costs as
compared to the other technologies and hence are the ﬁrst ones in the order. The eﬀect of RES pushes
the supply curve to the right, and this is shown in Figure 1b.
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 1. Theoretical merit order without (a) and with renewable energy from wind (b) (P = price of
electricity, Q = installed capacity shown as ratio to the average system demand).
The potential forecasts for demand can be faulty and may still cause imbalances in real time,
coupled with increased unpredictability due to increased injection of wind power resulting in higher
demand for reserves [20]. IM or the balancing market represents the market where the trade of
deviations from the scheduled market positions is dealt with [21]. A real-time balancing market is
particularly useful for RES-E as they can provide higher forecast reliability closer to real time [6]. Due
to the very fast response times required to balance this market and the connected security issues, this
market is coordinated by the TSO [22]. Conventionally, TSOs contract minimum reserve from ﬁrm
capacity, or power plants with technology that can be easily ramped up and down to balance the grid.
Recently, regardless of the source technology, reserves are being contracted by the TSOs. Together,
these reserves form the activation price ladder that is shown in Figure 2. The terminology, cheap,
mid-priced, and expensive, refers to how much the TSO will have to pay for the reserves in case of
grid imbalance.
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Figure 2. Bid ladder for activating reserves. It is positive when available reserve capacity is used for
upward activation and negative when downward activation is required (based on [6]).
In order to ensure system security, TSOs procure balancing services from balancing service
providers. Instead of balancing service providers, in this article, we deal with the market participants,
called agents, who are the RES-E producers and industries as consumers and reserve providers. These
agents are responsible for keeping their portfolio balanced for a given period of time. An agent’s
portfolio is deﬁned by its nature. For the producers, the portfolio refers to the injection and also
oﬀ-take if it has storage facilities; for the industries, it is the consumption proﬁle, which can alter in
both directions to provide the necessary response to grid imbalance.
Following the IM pricing mechanism in Belgium, in this article, we also modeled a one-price
settlement mechanism for the IM. This represents the settlement side of the reserve market, where a
price is quoted every quarter of an hour, which represents the marginal activation cost of the reserves.
1.2. Hypothesis Formulation
Feed-in tariﬀs have proven to be superior for wind power promotion in countries like Denmark,
Germany, and Spain [26,27], as cited by [28], but such a system does not force the RES-E producers to
operate cost eﬃciently [28]. Although the subsidies for RES-E producers are slowly being phased out,
the question is if the subsidies are negatively aﬀecting the unharnessed potential of DSR as a means to
accommodate RES-E in the existing electricity network.
This is especially relevant for countries, like Belgium, where old and outdated nuclear or fossil fuel
power plants are scheduled to be decommissioned. In the period of 2020–2025, 5000 MW of nuclear
energy is scheduled to be phased-out when seven nuclear reactors will be shut down in Belgium [29].
If the phase-out is carried through, it is speculated that Belgium’s carbon footprint will deteriorate, as
the ﬁrm capacity will need to be replaced by fossil-based power plants. However, if Belgium replaces
non-renewable power technologies with RES-E technologies, the eﬀects on the grid balancing and
market prices will be signiﬁcant.
Currently, a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh is given to Belgian RES-E producers for every kWh of
wind energy injected into the grid [30]—while the installed wind capacity accounts for 13.2% of the
total installed power capacity [31]. Using Belgium’s example, we assessed varying levels of feed-in
tariﬀs (τ) (0.01, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04 €/kWh) for their eﬀect on the consumption of renewable energy from
the grid. Likewise, the eﬀect of increasing the installed capacity of wind farms (Δx) is tested to observe
which of the two factors; τ or Δx, has a higher impact on increasing injection of wind energy in the
grid. Although the example of Belgium is quoted here to design the experiments, our aim is to gain a
principle mechanistic understanding in a virtual lab approach rather than analyze a speciﬁc case study.
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The ﬁnancial incentives for the RES-E producers are designed in a way to shift the additional cost
to all ratepayers connected to the grid (commons)—hence, the more customers shift to responding to
RE supply, the less the amount that is paid by the commons [32]. To mimic this behavior, industries
are modeled to participate in the IM by providing reserves in the form of ﬂexible demand, at three
levels of reserve prices—cheap, mid-priced, and expensive. The energy intensive industries have been
assessed for their high potential of DSR in the works of [11,33]. This aﬀects the system in a way that
the actions of RES-E producers and ﬂexible consumers beneﬁt the whole system by driving the price of
electricity low. All consumers beneﬁt from lower electricity prices and not just the providers of demand
ﬂexibility; the beneﬁts of demand response can be considered to be truly societal in nature [32,34].
The assumptions explained above lead to the two hypotheses of the study; ﬁrst, ﬁnancial incentives
coupled with high capacity of wind power production result in higher consumption from RES-E;
second, these factors result in low electricity market prices.
The rest of the article is written to ﬁrst present the model methodology following the ODD +
D (Overview, Design concepts, Details + human Decision-making) protocol [35]. The next section
gives the statistical analysis of the simulations and provides linear regression models that deﬁne the
system outcomes based on the eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs and installed capacity of wind power. Results are
followed by a discussion of the main ﬁndings of the article. In the last section, main conclusions are
drawn based on the ABM to generate data for testing the hypotheses.
2. Methodology
This chapter ﬁrst details themethodology behind theABM thatwas prepared to run the simulations
and then describes the statistical analysis that helped in testing the hypotheses by using the data
generated by the model.
2.1. Developing the ABM
Netlogo (6.0.2, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA) [36] was used for modelling the
electricity grid for this paper. ODD + D protocol is followed to ensure comprehensiveness when
reporting ABMs as it ensures that the description of the main theories and underlying assumptions in
the model are clearly explained [35,37]. In this section, the parts of ODD + D that are included consist
of Purpose; Entities, state variables and scales; Process overview and scheduling. The sections on
Design concepts; Initialization; Input data; and sub-models are provided in Appendix A.
2.1.1. Purpose
The model has been designed for generating data to test the hypotheses that increased τ, increased
Δx and demand ﬂexibility from industries result in more inclusion of renewable power in the grid and
lowered market prices.
2.1.2. Entities, State Variables and Scales
The electricity grid modeled in this paper consists of three main agent groups; the electricity
producers that are the wind farms, the large electricity consumers that are the industries, and the Small
and Medium sized Consumers (SMCs) that are the households and small businesses. All of the agents
are connected to the grid, which is operated by a grid operator, who ensures that the grid frequency is
kept stable by reducing the mismatch between the supply and demand to zero. This system needs an
eﬃcient information and communication technology support. However, the technical details of the
smart grid are beyond the scope of this article.
The model runs with quarter hourly time steps over a period of one year. The electricity grid
is modeled as an island (thus, imbalance is zero), where the connections to markets or production
systems outside of the model do not exist. The system parameters and the state variables are provided
in Table 1. The parameters and variables that are agent dependent are detailed in Appendix A (see
Table A1).
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Literature supports that fewer actors providing ﬂexibility increases the likelihood of power they
can exercise in deﬁning the market price [38]. To avoid this, it was also assumed that the size or
capacity of the actors does not limit their ability to participation in either of the two markets. The
properties of the agents are further described in the section below.
a. RES-E producers (2 groups)
The large RES-E producers are modeled as onshore wind farms, with each turbine of an average
capacity of 2 ± 0.4 MW and an average rotor diameter of 80 ± 20 m and a Levelized Cost Of Electricity
(LCOE) of 0.053 €/kWh (for year 2017) [39]. LCOE is deﬁned as the cost to produce 1 MWh of electricity
with a given technology is the sum of the annualized investment costs, the fuel costs, the operational
and management costs and the carbon costs [40].
The on-shore wind farmswere selected over the oﬀshore ones because their LCOE is comparable to
the other technologies modeled in the ABM [39]. All RES-E producers can sell the produced electricity
to the electricity markets. The proﬁt of the RES-E producers is a function of subsidy, operating cost,
and the market price in a particular moment. The market for selling electricity is chosen based on the
diﬀerence between the nominated supply and actual supply. If the actual supply is less than or equal to
the nominated supply, DAM price is used for proﬁt calculation. However, if the actual supply is more
than the nominated supply, the extra production is placed on the IM and the IM price is considered for
proﬁt calculation, if their provided reserves are engaged on IM. At the start of the model run, all RES-E
producers are randomly assigned a production strategy, which divides them into two strategic groups:
1. Non-storing producers: RE producers who do not own storage but in cases of grid imbalance can
curtail their production.
2. Storing producers: Storing RES-E producers who can store electricity when the actual supply
exceeds nominated supply. They provide the stored electricity and the available storage capacity
as reserves on the IM.
b. Large industries (4 groups)
The large consumers are grouped under the category of industries. All the industries are modeled
to produce one unit of product per kWh of electricity consumed. The price of one unit of product
is assumed to be 1€. Each industry has a smart metering system; hence, information of their own
nominated and the actual consumption is available to all industries in real time. Each of the industries
has a maximum capacity of 50% ﬂexibility in their electricity consumption. However, they are divided
into four groups, three provide reserves on the IM, while the fourth group does not. The bidding prices
for each group are hypothesized and are based on the relative LCOE of other technologies that are
included in the study, so that the bidding price of the most expensive reserve is not above the most
expensive technology (modeled as an electrolyzer) and the price of the cheapest reserves is lower than
the LCOE of wind (without subsidy). The groups are labelled as following based on their strategies:
• Group 0—non-ﬂex: Industries that do not engage in the IM.
• Group 1—cheap reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.04 €/kWh.
• Group 2—mid-priced reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.08
€/kWh.
• Group 3—expensive reserves: industries that provide reserves at a symmetric price of 0.14 €/kWh.
c. Small or medium sized consumers (SMCs) (2 groups)
The householdsmake up this agent group. They are deﬁned by an average electricity consumption
of 12 ± 1 kWh/day, which is the average consumption of a European household [41]. The consumption
pattern of SMCs depends on the time of the day. Each agent in this group is charged with a bill at
the end of the year for the amount of electricity that they consume. Half of the consumers also have
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Photovoltaic (PV) panels and are hence termed prosumers. The electricity produced by prosumers is
ﬁrst used to meet own demand and the extra is placed on the grid. However, if there is no demand
for this electricity, the grid operator can decide to cut the injection of electricity from prosumers. The
prosumers do not receive the proﬁt for injecting electricity in the grid because it is assumed that the
cost of smart meters and the grid operational costs will balance the proﬁt that the prosumers may gain.
In the model, this electricity is placed by the TSO on the DAM with a price of 0.08 €/kWh, which is the
LCOE of a PV [42]. The prosumers pay a fee for getting access to the grid. In Flanders (Belgium), it is
an annual ﬂat fee of 85 €, which is also used in this model to calculate the bill of the prosumers [43]. In
the model, the SMCs fall into following two categories based on their strategies:
1. Prosumers: SMCs with PV panels,
2. Consumers: SMCs without PV panels.
All SMCs receive the bill at the end of the year, which is calculated by considering the annual
average price of both electricity markets. In case of the prosumer, the self-consumption is billed as 0.
d. Electricity markets
There are two market environments modeled; DAM and IM. In the ABM, all technologies that
participate in the market are ranked according to their LCOEs.
An inﬂexible base load (abbreviated as ﬁxed-prod) is assumed to provide 20% of the average
system consumption at an LCOE of 0.02 €/kWh, comparable to the cost of a hydro power plant in
Europe [44]. 10% of the average system consumption is provided by the ﬂexible or interruptible gas
ﬁred power plant (NG plant) at a cost of 0.04 €/kWh [40]. The renewable energy capacity from the
RES-E producers (RES-wind) is modeled to match at least 25% and at maximum a 100% of the average
demand of the system. Half of the SMCs are also modeled to own PV panels, the capacity of which as
determined to meet the SMC’s own average demand per annum. The electricity that is put on the grid
by the SMCs is termed as RES-solar.
On the DAM, the consumers and producers nominate consumption and production capacity,
respectively, for the next 24 h. The match between the supply and demand deﬁnes 24 values of the
market price on the next day. This is done based on themerit order of cheaper to expensive technologies
that are engaged to provide the supply. In case of limited supply and a DAM price higher than 0.1
€/kWh, it is assumed that a backup technology (R-tech) is used to provide the necessary electricity and
ensures that the market price does not rise further and the system remains stable. The price of buying
electricity from the backup technology is a constant 0.1 €/ kWh. Since consumption deﬁnes how much
supply will be engaged and never the other way around, the price of DAM never drops below the
price of the cheapest technology. It also ensures that the DAM price never rises above 0.1 €/kWh. The
merit order of these technologies from the cheapest to the most expensive is shown in Figure 3.
 
Figure 3. Merit order of the technologies that participate in Day Ahead Market (P = price of electricity,
Q = installed capacity shown as ratio to the average system demand).
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Increasing levels of RES-wind capacity and RES-solar are expected to stabilize the DAM price at a
lower value. However, in the case of low demand, this increased production capacity may lead to a
surge in the injection and would require to be settled in the IM. The IM is a quarter hourly market and
hence operates to balance mismatch between supply and demand at a time scale of ﬁfteen minutes.
The default value for IM price is 0 €/kWh, unless the demand or supply deviate from their day ahead
nominations, causing an imbalance. The former triggers a downward activation, which means that the
reserves are requested to decrease consumption or an upward activation from the RES-E producers is
required. The agents who engage in the IM are the industries who provide reserves and the RES-E
producers. The other technologies in IM consist of a ﬂexible Natural Gas (NG) ﬁred power plant with
a bid price of 0.04 €/kWh, and an electrolyzer with a symmetric bid price of 0.2 €/kWh. The merit order
of these reserves is provided in Figure 4.
 
Figure 4. Bid ladder for reserves activation, without a feed-in tariﬀ for wind farms.
The model includes a number of parameters for the agents, technologies, and the market
environments that have been explained above. In addition, during the simulation runs, the ﬂow of
electricity and money between the agents is governed by diﬀerent variables that again deﬁne the state
of the agents, technologies, and the market environments. While Table 1 provides the information for
the technologies and the market environment, the detailed information about the agents can be found
in the annex (see Table A1).
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Table 1. Parameters and state variables.
Deﬁnition Values Unit
Parameters (Do Not Change during the Simulation Runs)
Cpv LCOE 1 of photovoltaic panels calculated over 20 years period [42]. 0.088 €/kWh
Cwind LCOE of wind turbines calculated over a time period of 20 years [42] 0.053 €/kWh
τ feed-in tariﬀs given to RES-E 2 producers based on data from Belgium 0–0.04 €/kWh
Δx
total production capacity of wind farms as a ratio of average system
consumption. x represents the ratio
0–100 %
wind average wind velocity in Belgium [45] 4 m/s
Ctech
price of electricity bought and sold to the backup technology that can
balance the grid imbalances and is engaged a day ahead of actual
supply.
The hypothetical value of 0.1 €/kWh is considered because this is higher
than the LCOE of photovoltaic panels but still comparable to LCOE of
biogas power plants [40]
0.1 €/kWh
Δcheap sum of capacity provided by the cheap reserves kWh
Δmedium sum of capacity provided by the mid-priced reserves kWh
Δexpen sum of capacity provided by the expensive reserves kWh
βelectro
symmetric bidding price of electrolyzer. Depending on the country the
price may vary [46] 0.2 €/kWh
βwind bidding price of RES-E from wind farms 0.06 €/kWh
βstore
bidding price for the electricity provided or consumed by battery
storage of wind farm owners 0.18 €/kWh
Δin f lex capacity of inﬂexible power production system
20% of average
demand kW
Δtech capacity of the back-up system ∞ kW
Cin f lex LCOE of inﬂexible hydro power production system 0.02 €/kWh
ΔNG
sum of capacity provided by the ﬂexible natural gas plant that
participates in DAM 3
10% of average
demand kW
CNG LCOE of the ﬂexible natural gas ﬁred power plant [40] 0.04 €/kWh
State variables (may change in every time step)
wpred predicted wind intensity at that quarter on the next day 0–1 range
spred predicted solar irradiation at that quarter on the next day 0–1 range
DAM.Spred predicted and engaged supply to meet the demand on DAM kWh
DAM.Dpred predicted demand from the system on DAM kWh
RES.wpred total predicted production from the wind farms kWh
RES.spred total predicted production from prosumers kWh
RES.wact total production from the wind farms in real time kWh
DAM.Sact supply in real time before balancing kWh
DAM.Dact demand in real time before balancing kWh
CDAM day ahead market price of electricity −0.15–0.15 €/kWh
wact wind intensity in real-time 0–1 range
sact solar irradiation in real-time 0–1 range
RES.sact total production from the prosumers in real time kWh
RES.wIM
production from wind farms that has been made available to balance
the grid at βwind
kWh
RES.wstore
production from storing agents that has been made available to balance
the grid at βstore
Rwind ratio of the RES-wind-act that is needed for activation on IM %
Rtech capacity activated from the backup technology for balancing DAM kWh
CDAM.annum annual DAM price.
34656∑
i=0
CDAM /34656
CIM.annum annual IM 4 price.
34656∑
i=0
CIM /34656
CIM imbalance market price −0.2–0.2 €/kWh
QRE% percentage of the total yearly demand of the system met by RES-E 0–100 %
1: Levelized Cost of Electricity; 2: Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources; 3: Day Ahead Market; 4:
Imbalance Market.
For the data onwind velocity and solar irradiation, the database of Belgian Electricity Transmission
System Operator, Elia was used [47]. The data on wind velocity and solar irradiation are not meant
to depict the exact values but create a realistic pattern of wind speed and solar irradiation in a year
272
Energies 2019, 12, 4314
for Belgium. More information on how these data were acquired and how the wind power and solar
power are calculated is provided in the annex.
2.1.3. Process Overview and Scheduling
The sequence of actions for the model is depicted in Figure 5.
 
Figure 5. Process overview of the model.
After the model has been set up, the model is run in the following order:
1. Predicting consumption and production for the next day,
2. Setting a DAM price for each hour of the day,
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3. Actual consumption and production in every quarter,
4. Calculating the system imbalance to decide to engage the IM,
5. Based on the imbalance, setting the IM price for every 15 min,
6. Updating the system variables,
7. Calculating proﬁt,
8. Storing the unitary proﬁt producers at the end of every month,
9. Storing the unitary bill of SMCs and industries at the end of every month,
10. Changing behavior based on the comparison of unitary bill and unitary proﬁt with other agents
in the past three months,
11. At the end of the year, calculate the bill for SMCs.
2.2. Statistical Analysis
The two main variables in this study that were varied to test their eﬀect on the whole system
are feed-in tariﬀs (τ), and the installed capacity of wind power as a ratio of the average demand of
the whole system (Δx). Both variables are treated as continuous variables with ranges of 0 to 0.04
for τ and a range of 0 to 1.00 for Δx. Three response variables were observed in the analyses; QRE%
(percentage of system demand met by RES-E), CDAM.annum (the annualized DAM price) and CIM.annum
(the annualized IM price). The ABM was used to run 5000 simulations to generate data that were then
ﬁtted with linear regression models using the statistical program R [48]. All statistical tests were two
sided and had a signiﬁcance level of 0.05%.
3. Results
3.1. Eﬀect on the RES-E Consumption
Figure 6 shows the mean RES-E consumption for all scenarios which is noted to increase sharply
following the increase in Δx until the installed capacity reaches 35% after which the slope becomes less
steep. To explain the eﬀect of τ and Δx on QRE%, the data were ﬁtted with a linear regression model
(Equation (1)).
̂QRE% = 8.178+ 54.958(Δx) − 0.185(τ0.01) + 0.173(τ0.02) + 1.063(τ0.03)+
2.373(τ0.04) + 0.0806(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.728(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.476(Δx.τ0.03)+
11.333(Δx.τ0.04).
(1)
Figure 6. Linear regression line ﬁtted to the observed values of consumption from renewable sources
(percentage of total system consumption).
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The linear model for QRE% explains 95% of the variations in the observed percentage of system
consumption from renewable sources with a residual standard error of 4.16%. The curvature in the
predictions for QRE% is not explained solely by the above linear equation. Hence, the data were divided
into two sections with Δx < 35% and Δx ≥ 35% for further explanation. This resulted in two regression
models, which are depicted by the Equations (2) and (3). The regression model (Equation (2)) explains
88% of the variations in QRE%, with a residual standard error of 3.14% (1740 degrees of freedom). While
the second model (Equation (3)) explains 83% of the variation in QRE% with a residual standard error
of 4.266% (3240 degrees of freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on
the parameter estimates for the regression models. The ﬁtted trend line for each value of τ for each
regression model is shown in Figure 6:
When Δx < 35%,
̂QRE% = 3.315+ 77.813(Δx) − 0.374(τ0.01) − 0.285(τ0.02) + 0.562(τ0.03)+
0.424(τ0.04) + 1.846(Δx.τ0.01) + 2.328(Δx.τ0.02) + 2.710(Δx.τ0.03) + 20.180(Δx.τ0.04),
(2)
When 35% ≤ Δx ≤ 100%,
̂QRE% = 15.701+ 44.560(Δx) − 0.646(τ0.01) + 0.118(τ0.02) + 1.134(τ0.03)+
5.742(τ0.04) + 0.670(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.700(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.618(Δx.τ0.03) + 6.697(Δx.τ0.04). (3)
When the maximum Δx is less than 35%, the increase of every 10% in Δx in the absence of any
feed-in tariﬀs will result in an increase of 7.7% in QRE%. The regression lines (t0.01, t0.02, t0.03, and
t0.04) show the eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs (Figure 6). When Δx is increased by 10%, it results in 3.4, 5.0, 6.5,
and 9.1% increase in QRE%, until Δx reaches 35%. Equation (3) shows a less steep slope in predictions
for QRE% as Δx increases from 35% to 100%. It shows that, in the absence of feed-in tariﬀs when Δx
increases by 10%, it results in an increase of 4.4% in QRE%. In addition, the eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs at
0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04 €/kWh results in a respective increase of 4.5, 4.3, 4.3, and 5.1% in QRE% for
every 10% increase in the value of Δx until it reaches 100%. This analysis shows that the increase in Δx
is the main factor that aﬀects the increase in QRE% as compared to increasing values of τ.
Conclusively, the statistical analysis shows that there is not enough evidence to reject that there is
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of τ and the Δx on the consumption of renewable energy (p-value < 2 × 10−16).
In fact, both factors result in increasing the consumption from RES-E, with the most rapid increase
observed when feed-in tariﬀs for RES-E producers are provided at a value of 0.04 €/kWh while the
installed capacity of wind power is between 0 and 35%.
3.2. Eﬀect on the Market Prices
The two market prices dictate the proﬁts of the industries and the producers and the bill for the
SMCs in the system, hence the factors that aﬀect the market prices inﬂuence all the agents in a direct or
an indirect manner. The two graphs in Figure 7 show the eﬀect of τ and Δx on the two market prices.
For DAM, the four tariﬀ levels show a signiﬁcant eﬀect as the Δx is increased. The four trend lines
for each value of τ are shown in Figure 7a, while the linear model from where these trend lines are
acquired is given in Equation (4). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on the
parameter estimates for the regression model.
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Figure 7. Annualized DAM (a) and IM (b) price observations from the simulations.
When the data observed for annual DAM prices were ﬁtted in a linear regression model (Equation
(4)), it showed signiﬁcant eﬀect of τ and Δx. The regression model for DAM prices explains 97% of the
variation in the annualized DAM prices with a residual standard error of 0.0006169 (4990 degrees of
freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on the parameter estimates
for the regression model. The regression model predicts that, under the sole eﬀect of increasing Δx,
the annualized DAM prices will increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh for every 10% of increase in Δx. From
the four trend lines in Figure 7a, it is derived that, for 10% of increase in Δx and feed-in tariﬀs at 0.01,
0.02, and 0.03 €/kWh, a respective increase of 0.09, 0.06, and 0.03 €cents/kWh can be expected in the
mean annualized DAM price—while a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh provided to the RES-E producers
can result in a decrease of 0.0007 €/kWh in the mean annualized DAM price with every 10% of increase
in Δx until it reaches 100%:
̂E[CDAM.annum] = 0.002+ 0.001(Δx) − 0.0006(τ0.01) − 0.001(τ0.02) − 0.001(τ0.03)−
0.0002(τ0.04) − 0.003(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.006(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.010(Δx.τ0.03) − 0.013(Δx.τ0.04).
(4)
The data for annualized IM prices shown in Figure 7b show an increase in the IM prices until
Δx is above 25%, after which the data show a downward trend. Therefore, we divided the data into
two parts and ﬁtted separate regression models to them to explain the pattern that is followed by the
IM prices. The linear regression model in Equation (5) explains the 72% of the variations in the IM
prices when Δx < 25%, with a residual standard error of 0.001266 (1240 degrees of freedom). Equation
(7) explains 87% of the variations in the IM prices when 25% ≤ Δx ≤ 100%, with a residual error of
0.003329 (3740 degrees of freedom). See Appendix B (Table A2) for the more detailed information on
the parameter estimates for the regression models:
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.0062− 0.029(Δx) − 0.0004(τ0.01) − 0.0009(τ0.02)−
0.001(τ0.03) + 0.003(τ0.04) − 0.001(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.002(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.03(Δx.τ0.03) − 0.009(Δx.τ0.04).
(5)
The trend lines that are added to the graphs are indeed acquired from these main equations. It is
visible in Figure 7b that t0.01, t0.02, and t0.03 have an almost equal slope, whereas t0.04 has a steeper
slope in the ﬁrst part of the graph and a smoother slope in the second part of the graph. Equation
(6) shows that, in the absence of feed-in tariﬀs, with a 10% increase in Δx, the annualized IM prices
will increase by 0.03 €cents/kWh. This is due to the fact that, when there is less wind power being
produced, the RES-E producers cannot oﬀer large volumes of power on DAM, resulting in deﬁcit of
supply. Hence, when IM prices also spike, RES-E producers (storing and non-storing) cannot oﬀer
much to balance the grid. This results in more expensive reserves being engaged on IM. In addition,
when the feed-in tariﬀ of 0.01 €/kWh is provided to the RES-E producers, it results in little eﬀect on the
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position of RES-E producers in the bid ladder, and only results in increasing the IM prices by 0.004
€cents/kWh for every 10% increase in Δx.
For feed-in tariﬀs of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh, the RES-E producers move to a second spot on the merit
order list for DAM. This leaves less reserves from RES-E producers being made available for IM. This
shift of positions in the merit order causes more power being oﬀered as supply (to compensate for the
unpredictable nature of wind). This results in a decrease in IM prices by 0.033 and 0.044 €cents/kWh,
respectively. Furthermore, when feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh is provided to the RES-E producers, it
moves their position to ﬁrst in the DAM bid ladder. This results in more volumes being made available
for DAM from all RES-E producers. This leaves almost no stored reserves available for the IM, which
results in engaging more expensive reserves and ultimately increasing the IM prices.
When Δx < 25%,
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.001+ 0.0031(Δx) − 0.0001(τ0.01) − 0.00005(τ0.02) − 0.0003(τ0.03)
+0.0028(τ0.04) − 0.002(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.006(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.007(Δx.τ0.03) + 0.011(Δx.τ0.04).
(6)
When 25% ≤ Δx ≤ 100%,
̂E[CIM.annum] = 0.009− 0.034(Δx) − 0.0007(τ0.01) − 0.001(τ0.02) − 0.001(τ0.03)
+0.004(τ0.04) − 0.0005(Δx.τ0.01) − 0.0007(Δx.τ0.02) − 0.002(Δx.τ0.03) + 0.008(Δx.τ0.04).
(7)
This trend in IM price changes once Δx is increased above 25%. This results in decreasing the
IM prices as Δx increases, with and without the provision of feed-in tariﬀs. In the absence of τ, every
10% increase in Δx results in a decrease of 0.03 €cents/kWh. It is simply an eﬀect of extra volume
of electricity being produced by the RES-E producers when there is no demand. The trend lines in
Figure 7, derived from Equation (7), exhibit that, with every 10% increase in Δx until it reaches 100%,
the IM price decreases by 0.034, 0.035, 0.036, and 0.026 €cents/kWh, respectively, when feed-in tariﬀs
are 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04 €/kWh. Other than the decrease in IM prices in relation to increasing Δx,
it is also worth noting that the mean IM prices remain higher when a feed-in tariﬀ of 0.04 €/kWh is
provided to the RES-E producers. This is again an eﬀect of the all electricity volumes being made
available for DAM, leaving no predicted volumes for storage on the next day. This results in, ﬁrstly,
too much supply (hence negative IM prices) and, secondly, no stored electricity reserves (hence more
expensive reserves being engaged).
The statistical analyses presented above show that there is not enough evidence to reject the
second hypothesis of the study and there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of τ and the Δx on the two market prices
(p-values < 2 × 10−16).
3.3. Eﬀect on Diﬀerent Agents
Graphs (a,b) in Figure 8 show the mean unitary proﬁts for the two industry groups diﬀerent
feed-in tariﬀs and increasing Δx. It is evident that, with increasing Δx, the unitary proﬁts of ﬂexible
industries, who engage in the IM, increase when τ is 0.04 €/kWh. For all other values of τ, the mean
proﬁts of ﬂexible industries decrease with increasing Δx. This eﬀect is owed to the modelling method
of ﬂexible industries, who always respect their nominated consumption pattern. This results in them
paying the bill, which is heavily dictated by the DAM price. Thus, as the DAM price decreases,
the proﬁt of ﬂexible industries increases. Although ﬂexible industries respond to demand changes
according to the imbalance on the grid, the IM bidding prices are not as high to compensate for the
production losses. However, the unitary proﬁt of the inﬂexible industries (which do not participate in
IM and do not respect their nominated consumption) shows no variation as a response to increasing
feed-in tariﬀs and installed capacity of wind power. The more selﬁsh consumption of electricity results
in a very stable proﬁt for the inﬂexible industries. However, in reality, such deviations from nominated
power can result in ﬁnes for large consumers.
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Figure 8. (a,b) Mean unitary proﬁt for each industries (€/kWh).
The eﬀects of the τ and Δx were also assessed for impact on the proﬁts of the two producer groups
separately. Figure 9a shows the mean unitary proﬁts of storing RES-E producers, where the variation
between the diﬀerent simulations is very narrow and the eﬀect of diﬀerent feed-in tariﬀs does not
appear to cause a pronounced variation in the proﬁts. However, the general trend that can be observed
from this ﬁgure is of decreasing proﬁts as the installed capacity of wind increases. On the contrary,
Figure 9b shows higher mean unitary proﬁts of the non-storing agents. The most interesting conclusion
from the graphs in Figure 9 is that the overall mean proﬁt of non-storing agents is higher than the
storing RES-E agents. In addition, increasing Δx negatively aﬀects the proﬁt of storing producers,
while it increases the proﬁt for non-storing agents when τ is 0.01 and 0.02 €/kWh but results in a
decreasing proﬁt as Δx increases for a value of 0.03 and 0.04 €/kWh for τ. The simple reason is the
decreasing proﬁts of storing and non-storing RES-E producer (only under τ of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh)
is the extra volumes of wind power being made available on the grid, while the demand does not
increase accordingly.
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 9. (a,b) Mean unitary proﬁt of producers (€/kWh).
The numbers on top of Figure 9a,b show the number of storing and non-storing RES-E producers
at the end of the simulation runs. It shows that the number of RES-E storing producers is almost
double the number of RES-E non-storing producers. Due to the adaptation function, modeled in the
ABM, it shows that more RES-E producers chose to have storage, as it would have prevailed as a more
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proﬁtable strategy during the simulation runs. At the start of every simulation run, the number of
RES-producers is modeled to be random with an equal chance of any RES-E producers appointed
storage facilities. This eﬀect could be a result of lower operating costs for the RES-E producers and
hence a higher chance of being engaged on DAM (ﬁrst position in the bid ladder) and IM (ﬁrst position
for non-stored electricity and fourth for the stored power).
Finally, the mean unitary bill for households with PV panels and without being in relation with
increasing values of Δx is shown in Figure 10. Comparison of Figure 10a,b shows that the mean bill of
SMCs follows the same pattern as the market prices. When the mean bill of consumers is separated
according to the ownership of PV panels, it suggests that it is, in fact, not very proﬁtable for households’
own PV panels when the installed capacity of wind energy is above 50% of the average system demand,
as compared to the households without PV panels. There are two factors that cause disparity between
the bill of the prosumers and consumers; ﬁrst, the amount of consumption of electricity from the grid,
and, second, the eﬀect of the prosumer tariﬀ. The very limited variation in the bill of the prosumers is
a result of their limited reliance on the grid to fulﬁll their needs, which results in almost no eﬀect of the
market prices on their unitary bill, as compared to the consumers who rely solely on the grid for the
electricity supply.
 
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 10. (a,b) Mean unitary bill (€/kWh) for each Small and Medium Sized Consumer group.
4. Discussion
Negative market prices for electricity are a rare phenomenon. In our results, the IM prices fall
below zero with increasing values of Δx above 25%. In reality, the European energy grid allows the
grid imbalances to be reduced from the diﬀerent countries, while, in this model, the grid is modeled as
a stand-alone system, hence negative values on IM are observed more frequently than in reality.
From the results, it is obvious that the two market prices are decoupled, where the DAM prices
remain signiﬁcantly higher than the IM prices. This is a result of how the markets were modeled,
allowing for the wind farm owners to bid their extra capacity on the IM. The authors in [23] mentioned
that, if capacity bids from RES-E are in use on the reserve market, the energy price on reserve markets
may get lower than on the intra-day market, creating distorting incentives. It shows the ability of the
presented ABM to depict the working of the electricity markets.
The decreasing market prices in the simulations as a result of the increasing installed capacity of
wind energy have also been observed in Germany. The authors in [49] have shown that, on the German
market, each additional GWh of RES-E fed to the grid has resulted in lowering the spot market price of
electricity by $1.4–1.7/MWh. The authors in [50] found that the negative prices on the DAM and IM
in Belgium, Germany, and France occur due to low consumption demand and high RE generation
expectation; one of the reasons is the current support mechanisms for solar and wind power [6].
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Conversely, it can be argued that decreasing the feed-in tariﬀs and increasing the installed capacity
of wind energy may result in deteriorating the proﬁt of the RES-E producers. This only stresses that,
once the subsidies are taken away, there is a need for diﬀerent rules for the ﬂexible RES-E producers to
support their participation in the market and increase the supply of RES-E.
Developments in the power electronic technologies have made the application of energy storage
systems a possible solution for modern (ﬂexible) power application [51,52]. It also has been shown
that battery-based energy storage with several minutes of run time is optimal for stabilizing wind
generation in weak grids [53]. However, these systems are still not economically viable for the wind
farm producers, as shown in the low proﬁts for the storing agents.
It needs to be mentioned that, since the average of the two market prices is considered for billing
the SMCs, the bills do not reﬂect reality. In reality, the supplier would nominate the consumption
on the market for the consumers under a contract and the consumers will be billed according to the
mismatch from these nominations. The average bill for the SMCs exhibits an opposite trend to what
was observed in Germany, where the electricity price increased by 30% from the year 2006 to 2012,
while the average household income grew by 6% [54]. To improve the accuracy of the bill for the SMCs,
it will be useful to include the service as well as the grid operation charges in the calculation of the bill.
In the simulation results, the very pronounced eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs for the RES-E producers
on the market prices points to the need to include more power production technologies in the model,
which will also reﬂect reality. One such technology could be dispatchable renewables, such as biomass.
Authors in [55] suggested that, for a power system completely based on renewables, these technologies
can be incentivized to increase ﬂexibility. Whether it is more eﬀective to incentivize wind farm owners
so they can compete with other technologies or rather provide incentives to dispatchable renewables
that can replace the fossil-fuel based systems could be another topic to use the presented ABM.
For businesses, the decision to provide ﬂexibility as a reserve is complex and can result in major
organizational and operational changes. In the model, the industries responded to supply changes
regardless of the time of the day and neither did they consider any lead times; in reality, though, this
is probably not the case. Although the simulations provide insightful results regarding industries’
electrical ﬂexibility as reserves, these results are not extended to other issues. For example, there
are legal issues involved when industries plan to market negative tertiary reserve energy in small
amounts because of tight storage restrictions [56]. Another reason to keep the industries from providing
ﬂexibility as demand response could lie in the relatively low energy price that they pay (as compared
to other costs) and could be mitigated by policies opposite to the ones in practice that subsidize heavy
industries [57]. Other incentives for energy intensive industries to reduce their energy costs lie in their
ability to install combined heat and power plants. The authors in [58] assessed in detail the beneﬁts
for industries to engage in symbiotic relations and utilize waste (biomass) to fuel combined heat and
power plants. One can argue in favor of such practices against consumption ﬂexibility, especially if it
does not incur changes in business as usual.
Finally, the complexity of a ﬂexible electric grid poses a challenge to the diﬀusion process of
ﬂexibility [59]. Flexibility in consumption and production of power requires a longer time to be
successful and completely diﬀused as an important component of the social aspect of the power system.
It will require changes in human behavior and institutional setup; both domains with high inertia
towards change [57]. One example of this phenomenon, termed response fatigue, occurs when the
consumers tire of continuously responding to supply (and/or market price) signals. This behavior
was reported in [60], with up to 98% of the residential consumers who participated in a demand
response program. The results of the model point to higher need for ﬂexibility and demand response
from the consumers for the increased injection of RES-E in the grid. If the households are also to be
included as active participants of demand response, there is a need to provide them with awareness
and information on the energy markets, next to the provision of in-home display devices that will
provide them with real-time information on their consumption and market prices [10].
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5. Conclusions
The objective of this article was to model the two electricity markets (day ahead and imbalance
market) by using Agent-based Model (ABM) and assess two hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothesis was to
test the eﬀect of increasing feed-in tariﬀs (τ) and installed capacity of wind energy (Δx) on increasing
the consumption from renewables. The second hypothesis was to check the eﬀect of the same factors
on decreasing the two market prices. This objective was successfully met by using ABM to generate
the data that were then ﬁt into linear regression models to reach conclusions on the hypotheses.
The study concludes that, with increasing Δx by 10%, the consumption from RES-E increases by
7.8% in the absence of τ, until Δx reaches a maximum of 35%. At diﬀerent levels of τ, the increasing
consumption from RES-E increases diﬀerently. The most pronounced is when τ is set at the value of
0.04 €/kWh and the maximum Δx is 35%. For Δx higher than 35% and less than 100%, the increase
in RES-E follows a less sharper increase and once again the sharpest increase is for τ = 0.04 €/kWh,
which under every 10% increase in Δx results in a 5.1% increase in RES-E consumption.
To test the hypothesis about the market prices, diﬀerent regression models were ﬁt to explain the
Day Ahead Market (DAM) and Imbalance Market (IM) prices. DAM prices increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh
for every 10% increase in Δx in the absence of τ. With increasing Δx when τ is provided at 0.01, 0.02
and 0.03 €/kWh, the increase in the DAM prices is less sharp. In addition, with every increase in the
value of τ, the mean DAM price is lowered as compared to the previous value of τ. When the value of
τ is 0.04 €/kWh, it results in decreasing DAM prices as Δx increases. The increasing values of τ enable
RES-E producers to nominate more power on the DAM at lower marginal costs, thus lowering the
overall DAM prices. At 0.04 €/kWh, the eﬀect of τ is two-fold because, at this level, the storing RES-E
producers can also nominate stored electricity on the DAM, while still being cost competitive. Hence,
more electricity is nominated for DAM and electricity prices are lowered as a result.
The regression model to explain the trend observed in the IM prices had to be split into two further
models. Brieﬂy reported, the regression models show that, in the absence of τ, every 10% increase in
Δx results in a decrease in IM price by 0.031 and 0.34 €cents/kWh when Δx is between 0 and 25% and
between 25% and 100%, respectively. The models also showed that, until the maximum Δx is less than
25%, the IM prices increase for the values of τ at 0.01 and 0.04 €/kWh, but decrease for τ of 0.02 and
0.03 €/kWh. When Δx is between 25% to 100%, increasing the values of τ until 0.03 €/kWh result in
lowering the mean IM price. However, at 0.04 €/kWh, the mean IM price is higher, showing the eﬀect
of no storage reserves being available on IM and more expensive reserves being engaged on the IM.
Conclusively, increasing values of τ and Δx increase the consumption of renewable energy and
decreases the market prices; with the eﬀect of Δx being more signiﬁcant than the eﬀect of τ. However,
the eﬀect of increasing values of both factors on the proﬁt of storing RES-E producers is not positive,
pointing to the need for customized rules and incentives to encourage their market participation and
investment in storage facilities. The results support that, in the future, with more RES-E producers,
diﬀerent market rules may apply to the ﬂexible RES-E and conventional generation [23].
Introducing ﬂexibility in the power grid as a response of more renewable energy is a challenging
task, as it requires institutional shift to a new way of production and consumption of electricity.
Changes in consumer behavior will be crucial to this shift, which adds to the complexity of this
inevitable undertaking. The approach of agent-based modelling can substantially contribute to the
study of electricity production and consumption behavior, while contributing to a just distribution
of costs and beneﬁts between the diﬀerent economic actors. It is worth mentioning that, though
the technical details of the model for each agent can be reﬁned to yield more insightful results, the
presented ABM is capable of carrying out a detailed study of cost–beneﬁt distribution between diﬀerent
agents in a grid solely fed by renewable power.
The results support that the RES-E agents do not have enough incentive to operate more eﬃciently
when feed-in tariﬀs are being provided to them. There need to be other support mechanisms that
promote investment in storage facilities for the RES-E producers. Market mechanisms that dictate ﬁnes
for deviating from nominated power can further demotivate actors in the power generation business
281
Energies 2019, 12, 4314
to switch to renewable energy technologies. The market mechanisms need to evolve to let more RES-E
producers participate. Additionally, the demand side response will aid this transition. As more local
balancing agents (aggregators) enter the power networks and virtual power plants are becoming a
reality, smart metering would replace net metering systems. This will provide an opportunity to the
consumers of all sizes to be ﬂexible in response to production and market signals, ultimately resulting
in a truly ﬂexible grid. Depending on the speciﬁc markets and their respective mechanisms in diﬀerent
countries, it is up to the policy makers to incentivize the consumers to change, hence create a market
pull for RES-E producers, and/or incentivize the RES-E producers to create a market push for change in
the consumer behavior. Finally, although Belgian wind and solar proﬁles were used for the simulations,
the observations from the model are transferrable to other countries where policy makers wish to
incentivize renewable power.
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Appendix A. Methodology
Table A1. Variables and parameters for the diﬀerent agents.
Deﬁnition Values Unit
Small and medium sized consumers
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
αSMC consumption capacity of a household [41] 0.125 kWh
ΔPV capacity of a photovoltaic panel [41] 1–2 kWh
Agent Variables (may change in every time step)
αpred predicted consumption for one quarter of an hour on the next day
αact actual consumption in real time
random.factor a number generated every quarter of an hour to introduce randomnessin the consumption proﬁle of the consumers 0.01–0.05
QPV production from the photovoltaic panels in real time
αsel f−cons consumption from own PV panel (only for prosumers)
QSMC
production from the PV-panels in real time that is planned for the
DAM.Spred
bill bill for the whole past year €
billunit per unit cost of electricity consumed in the past year €/kWh
Industry
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
αind average consumption of an industry 2000 (±400) kWh
group
group number deﬁning the strategy of the industry
Group 0: bid-cap of 0 kW
Group 1, 2, and 3: bid-cap of 50% of αind
0–3
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Table A1. Cont.
Deﬁnition Values Unit
Agent variables (may change in every time step)
αpred predicted consumption for one quarter of an hour on the next day
αact actual consumption in real time
αbid
for group 0, αbid = 0
for group 1, αbid = ΔbidΔ Rcheap
for group 2, αbid = ΔbidΔ Rmedium
for group 3, αbid = Δbid ΔRexpen
αIM
for group 0, αIM = αact − αpred
for group 1,2, and 3, αIM = αbid
αtot total consumption in the past month kWh
Δbid bidding capacity (ﬂexible demand) 50% of αind kW
bill bill for the past month €
P instantaneous proﬁt in every time step €
Punit unitary proﬁt for the past month €/kWh
RES-E Producers
Agent properties (do not change during the simulation runs)
Δprod average production capacity of a wind farm 4000 (±100) kW
Δstorage average storage capacity 20% of Δprod kW
Ccur costs for curtailing [61] 0.022 €/kWh
Cst LCOE 1 of battery storage [62] 0.176 €/kWh
strategy
strategy deﬁning if the producer will have storage or not
If 0, there is no storage facility
If 1, there is storage facility
0 or 1
Agent variables (may change in every time step)
Δreq(D+1) Required production per agent to meet the system demand kWh
Qnom nominated power production for the next day kWh
Qprod actual power production in real time kWh
Qact part or all of the Qprod made available for the system kWh
Qcurt curtailed power kWh
Qstored(t) stored power in real time kWh
QDAM production sold at the DAM 2, always ≤ Qnom kWh
Qbid production bid at the IM 3 kWh
QIM
production sold at the IM
If, Rwind > 0
QIM = Rwind ∗ Qbid
kWh
Qtot QDAM + QIM +QIM.st kWh
Qsum total production traded in the markets in the past month kWh
QIM.st
storage reserve engaged by IM. Value is positive when batteries are
discharged, and negative when batteries are charged kWh
P instantaneous proﬁt in every time step €
Punit unitary proﬁt for the past month €/kWh
1: Levelized Cost of Electricity; 2: Day Ahead Market; 3: Imbalance Market.
Appendix A.1. Sub-Models
Appendix A.1.1. Prediction of Consumption and Production
The model process begins on day = 0 and tick = 0, which depicts the hour 00:00 of a day. For the
ﬁrst quarter of an hour (one time step), the industries and SMCs predict consumption for the same
quarter on the next day. The prosumers from the SMCs also predict the production from the PV panels,
as QPV depending on the capacity of their solar panels (ΔPV). The producers calculate their production
(Qprod) based on the weather predictions for that quarter on the next day. For all RES-E producers,
Qprod is calculated as a product of their capacity (Δprod) and the predicted weather (wpred).
Based on the strategy of the RES-E producer, the predicted production varies. For non-storing
agents, it is equal to their Qprod, while, for storing agents, Δreq(D+1) and Qpred.stored deﬁne Qnom,
where Qpred.stored is the expected power production that will be stored, given that Qpred.stored does not
exceed Δstorage. Hence, the Qnom is based on Equations (A1) or (A3), and the value for Qpred.stored(t+1) is
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based on Equations (A2), (A4), or (A5). The conditions that deﬁne which equation is chosen for setting
the values are explained below:
If Δreq(D+1) ≥ Qprod + Qpred.stored(t), then
Qnom = Qprod +Qpred.stored(t), (A1)
Qpred.stored(t+1) = 0. (A2)
If Δreq(D+1) < Qprod + Qpred.stored(t), then
Qnom = Δreq(D+1). (A3)
If Δstorage ≥ Qprod + Qpred.stored(t) − Qnom
Qpred.stored(t+1) = Qprod +Qpred.stored(t) − Qnom. (A4)
Otherwise,
Qpred.stored(t+1) = Δstorage. (A5)
Appendix A.1.2. Setting the Day Ahead Market Price
DAM price is calculated by a merit order economic dispatch procedure. First, the total predicted
demand (DAM.Dpred) is calculated by summing the consumption (
∑n.ind
i=1 αpred +
∑n.SMC
i=1 αpred) and
then matched with the available supply from diﬀerent technologies arranged in order of increasing
bid price.
The technology prices in ascending order are: Cin f lex, CNG, βwind,Cpv, Ctech.
Once the supply volume is matched to the demand, the total predicted supply can be calculated
as:
DAM.Spred = Δin f lex + (RNGΔΔNG) + (RwindΔRES.wact) +
(
RsolarΔRES.spred
)
+ Rtech), (A6)
where
Rtech = DAM.Dpred −
(
Δin f lex + (RNGΔΔNG) + (RwindΔRES.wact
)
+
(
RsolarΔRES.spred
)
. (A7)
Since this process sets a price for every quarter, it is not representative of the DAM price. Hence,
at the end of every four ticks (four quarters), the values of the last four DAM prices are averaged and
one market price for the one whole hour is set. In this way on the next day, there are 24 DAM prices for
each hour of the day.
Appendix A.1.3. Actual Consumption and Production
Once day 1 begins, the industries consume electricity according to the time of the day and the day
of the week and their strategy. The SMCs consume electricity based on their respective proﬁle and
according to the time of the day, week of the month, and season.
For all SMCs, there consumption is a product of their predicted consumption (αpred) and a
random factor.
For consumers, αact is the same as αcons
For prosumers
If αcons ≥ QPV
QSMC = 0, (A8)
αsel f−cons = |QPV − αcons|, (A9)
αact = αcons − QPV. (A10)
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If αcons ≤ QPV
αsel f−cons = αcons, (A11)
QSMC = QPV − αsel f−cons, (A12)
αact = 0. (A13)
The consumption from all SMCs and industries (
∑n.SMC+n.ind
i=1 αact) sets the value for DAM.Dact
The RES-E producers produce electricity according to the weather conditions, and their production
is calculated based on their respective strategy.
For non-storing producers, they nominate production volumes ﬁrst on the DAM, based on their
knowledge of the expected consumption. In the model, this knowledge was substituted by using the
total consumption demand of the system as an indicator for the expected demand. Which volumes
will be oﬀered on DAM and what will be oﬀered to the IM are calculated as follows:
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0
QDAM = Qnom, (A14)
Qbid = Qact − QDAM. (A15)
If Qact − Qnom < 0
QDAM = Qact, (A16)
Qbid = 0 (A17)
for storing producers
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0 and Δstorage − Qstored(t−1) ≥ Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A18)
Qbid = 0, (A19)
Qstored(t) = Qact − Qnom + Qstored(t−1). (A20)
If Qact − Qnom ≥ 0 and Δstorage − Qstored(t−1) < Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A21)
Qstored(t) = Δstorage, (A22)
Qbid = Qstored(t) +Qact − QDAM. (A23)
If Qact − Qnom < 0 and Qstored(t−1) ≤ Qact − Qnom,
QDAM = Qnom, (A24)
Qbid = 0, (A25)
Qstored(t) = Qstored(t−1) − (QDAM − Qact). (A26)
If Qact − Qnom < 0 and Qstored(t−1) > Qact − Qnom
QDAM = Qact + Qstored(t−1), (A27)
Qstored(t) = 0, (A28)
Qbid = 0. (A29)
The Qbid from all RES-E producers (
∑n.prod
i=1 Qbid) provide the wind energy available for balancing
the grid (RES.wIM).
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It has to be mentioned that the storing producers provide Qstored(t) to the grid balancing, the sum
of which deﬁnes the whole stored electricity reserve (RES.wstore).
Whether that reserve, or part of it, is engaged, (QIM−st)will be declared in the following sub-model.
Likewise, if the reserves are not engaged and the RES-E producers do not have the capacity to store the
extra production or they do not own storage, then the extra production will be curtailed, setting the
value for Qcurt.
The sum of production from all RES-E producers (
∑n.prod
i=1 Qact) deﬁnes the value for RES.wact The
sum of production from all prosumers (
∑n.SMC
i=1 QSMC) provides the value for RES.sact.
At the end of this step, the supply from the technologies engaged on the previous day is calculated:
DAM.Sact = Δin f lex + (RNG ·ΔNG) + RES.wact + RES.sact. (A30)
Appendix A.1.4. Setting the Imbalance Market Price
Due toweather variations, there is a slight diﬀerence between the prediction and actual production,
in addition, since the SMCs do not own smart meters, their actual consumption does not coincide with
their predicted consumption at all times. Additionally, the inﬂexible industries (Group 0) also do not
always respect the nominated demand. This leads to imbalances in the volumes of electricity being fed
into the grid and the electricity that is taken-oﬀ, setting a non-zero value for IMimb When IMimb  0,
the extra demand (IM.Dact) is adjusted to meet the supply and supply (IM.Sact) is adjusted to meet the
demand, which results in providing values for the following equations:
IM.Dact = DAM.Dact + Δcheap·Rcheap + Δmedium·Rmedium + Δexpen·Rexpen + Δstore·Rstore +Qelec, (A31)
IM.Sact = DAM.Sact + RES.wact·Rwind + RES.wstore·Rstore + Qelec. (A32)
If the value of IMimb is positive, then the reserves on the right side of Figure A1 are activated,
while, if the value is negative, then the reserves on the left side of the ﬁgure are activated. The
price is set by the most expensive reserve that is engaged to balance the grid, in the ascending order
of βwind, βcheap, βmedium, βexpen, βstore, βelectro.
 
Figure A1. Bidding ladder for Imbalance Market.
However, in the presence of τ at the rate of 0.03 and 0.04 €/kWh, RES-E from wind and electricity
from battery storage becomes cheaper and hence moves a step lower in the price ladder. At the end
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of this step, the reserves that were engaged are declared and each corresponding agent calculates its
proﬁt based on these values.
Appendix A.1.5. Calculating Proﬁt for Industries and RES-E Producers
Producers’ proﬁt is calculated based on which market is used to trade electricity, the bidding
price, subsidy level, and curtailed amount of electricity. If the metered volume is less than or equal
to the nominated power, then DAM price is used for proﬁt calculation. In the other case, the extra
production is priced according to IM price only if it is engaged to balance the grid. If the surplus could
not be balanced, then the proﬁt is decreased as the cost for curtailing is considered in the equation.
For producers with storage, the same procedure is followed for proﬁt calculation, except for stored
electrical energy that is used to balance the grid, also increases the costs because of the high LCOE of
stored electricity.
For all RES-E producers:
If Qbid is 0, then values of QIM and Qcurt are set to be 0 as well.
If Rwind and Qbid are more than 0, then QIM is set as the product of Qbid and Rwind. In addition, the
value for Qcurt is then set at 0.
If Rwind is 0 but Qbid is more than 0, then the value of QIM is set to 0 and the Qbid is set as the value
for Qcurt.
For storing agents:
If Rstore  0, the value for QIM−st is the product of Qstored(t) and Rstore. What is left from stored
electricity after assigning the QIM−st is the new value of stored electricity (Qstored(t+1)).
The proﬁt for the storing agents is calculated as
Pprod = QDAM·CDAM +QIM·(βwind − τ) +
∣∣∣QIM−st· βstore∣∣∣− [Qtot · {(Cwind − τ) + (Ccur·Qcurt)}]. (A33)
The proﬁt for the non-storing agents is calculated as
Pprod = QDAM·CDAM +QIM · (βwind − τ) − [Qtot · {(Cwind − τ) + (Ccur·Qcurt)}]. (A34)
The total proﬁt gets updated in every time step until, at the end of the month (Ptot), it is divided
by the total production in the past month and the proﬁt/kWh of electricity produced is obtained, Punit.
The proﬁt for the industries is the remainder of the proﬁt from production of the industrial product
and the electricity bill. The proﬁt from the industrial product and electricity consumption is modeled
at 1:1. The bill is calculated based on the consumption of electricity and which market the electricity is
traded on.
For industries that do not engage in IM, if the consumption is lower than the nominated
consumption, then DAM price is assigned as electricity cost; otherwise, the IM price is considered
as cost. For industries, which engage in IM, the actual consumption is modeled to always match
the nominated one. If the reserves are engaged on IM, then, depending on upward activation or
downward activation, the consumption is recalculated. The proﬁt is then calculated as follows:
For Group 0,
if actual consumption (αact) ismore than predicted consumption (αpred), then the extra consumption
is assigned as the consumption from IM (αIM). Otherwise, the consumption from IM is set at 0.
The proﬁt for Group 0 is calculated as
P = (αDAM + αIM) − {(αDAM ·CDAM)+(αIM·CIM)}. (A35)
For Groups 1, 2, and 3, the consumption from IM is the product of their respective bidding capacity
(Δbid) and the multiplicative factor (Rcheap or Rmedium or Rexpen). This multiplicative factor is calculated
on a pro rata basis for all agents that provide reserves on the same price.
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The proﬁt for Groups 1, 2, and 3 is respectively calculated as follows:
P = (αDAM + αIM) +
∣∣∣∣αIM· βcheap/medium/expen
∣∣∣∣− αDAM·CDAM. (A36)
The total proﬁt gets updated in every time step until, at the end of the month, it is divided by the
total consumption in the past month and the unitary proﬁt (€/kWh) (Punit) is obtained.
Appendix A.1.6. Updating the System Variables
In every time step, the predicted values of wind (wpred) and solar irradiation (spred) are updated
and set for the next quarter to be used for the prediction of consumption and production on the next
day. In addition, the values for wind (wact) and solar irradiation (sact) in real time are set to be used for
grid balancing and IM.
The value of DAM price (CDAM) that was set on the day before is recalled from the memory and
used for the quarter in real time. In addition, IM price (CIM) for the past quarter is declared and stored
for all agents to calculate their respective proﬁt or bill. The value of the total system consumption is
updated (Qsystem); in addition, the variable for the total consumption from the renewables (QRE) is
recalculated and stored.
Appendix A.1.7. Changing Strategies
At the end of the month after receiving their respective bills, each agent is randomly paired up
with any other agent of the same group. They share the values of Punit and strategy. In four months,
the unitary proﬁt (Punit) of each agent is summed and averaged so it can be compared to the collected
four values of Punit from the paired agent.
After four months, the agent compares its own averaged proﬁt against the four values collected
from the randomly paired agents against its own averaged unitary proﬁt over the past four months. If
the agent has the highest proﬁt as compared to the paired agents, it keeps its own strategy. However, if
its own proﬁt is not the highest, then there is a probability of 50% that it will adopt the strategy of the
paired agent with the highest proﬁt.
Appendix A.1.8. Calculating Bill for the SMCs
At the end of the year, in the last time step of the simulation, the bill for the SMCs is calculated
based on the annually averaged value of CDAM and CIM and the total consumption in the year.
For the prosumers, self-consumption is not billed; however, a ﬂat fee of 85 €/kW is charged
for connection to the grid. This value is based on the prosumer fee that is charged in Flanders
(Belgium) [43]:
bill =
34656∑
i=0
αact ·(CDAM.annum + CIM.annum)/2 (A37)
where 34,656 is the total number of quarters in a year, and αtot is calculated as αtot =
34656∑
i=0
αact. The
unitary bill (€/kWh) is calculated by dividing the total bill by the total consumption (bill/αtot).
Appendix A.2. Design Concepts
1. Basic principles
The model is built on the hypothesis that subsidies given to producers of RE cause negative
market prices and result in adoption of less ﬂexible consumption practices by the consumers and a
lack of incentive for RES-E producers to invest in storage and curtailment mechanisms.
The behavior of industries and producers is modeled to represent bounded rationality based on
the availability of information about own proﬁt. All the agents make decisions that maximize their
own beneﬁt. It is also assumed that all agents gather information once a month about the unitary proﬁt
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(€/kWh) from a randomly selected agent of their own group and, after three months, the agents make a
decision with a probability of 50% to adopt the strategy that results in the maximum proﬁt against the
electricity produced or consumed.
The market prices included in this model only represent the energy content of the electricity that
is traded. In reality, the physical electricity component of the consumers’ bill is between 25–30% of
the total bill, while 60–75% of the bill consists taxes, grid fees, transmission and distribution service
charges, etc.
2. Emergence
A pattern is expected to emerge in the system due to the eﬀect of adopting the strategies by the
agents. For example, if most of the industries choose to provide cheap reserves on the IM, the whole
system has a lower IM price. This will result in lowering the proﬁt of the storing producers who may
not get to be engaged in the IM; it will also lower the bill of the SMCs. In addition, it will decrease the
costs for all industries in the system.
3. Adaptation
The RES-E producers adapt to the τ scheme and the market prices by adopting the more proﬁtable
strategy, to either buy storage, or only rely on curtailment whenever they produce more than the
nominated power. The industries adapt to the eﬀect of the strategy on their proﬁt by choosing either to
be part of the IM or not and what to price to bid for their reserves.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess the eﬀect of adaptation of the agents by using a
Paired Samples Wilcoxon Test (non-parametric). The only variables that were tested for sensitivity to
adaptation of agents; QRE% (percentage of system demand met by RES-E), CDAM.annum (the annualized
DAM price), and CIM.annum (the annualized IM price). These are the same variables that are assessed
for variation under the eﬀect of τ and Δx. The results indicated that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
values of QRE% when the adaptation is turned on vs. when there is no adaptation (p-value 5.421 ×
10−13). The values of CDAM.annum and CIM.annum do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
two sets of simulation results (p-values 0.1058 and 0.5518, respectively).
4. Objectives
The objective of producers and industries is to maximize their own beneﬁt either by increasing
the proﬁt gained by selling electricity or by buying cheap electricity.
5. Learning
No individual or collective learning is included in the model.
6. Prediction
The producers use weather predictions to predict the power produced on the next day. Industries
schedule their consumption for the next day based on time of the day.
7. Sensing
The producers and prosumers make use of the available weather information and predict their
production. In case of τ, the producers calculate their proﬁt by factoring them in. The industries and
SMCs calculate their bill based on the market prices. When there is surplus (deﬁcit) production, the
agents respond by providing upward reserves on the IM.
8. Interaction
Direct interaction between every two agents of the same category takes place at the end of every
month, when they share their unitary cost or proﬁt with each other. Indirect interaction occurs between
all agents in the grid due to their connectivity to the grid and the reliance of their proﬁt on the market
price that is calculated by pooling all the demand and production. Hence, the individual decisions of
the agents not only aﬀect their own proﬁt or bill but also of all other agents connected to the grid.
9. Stochasticity
The interactions between the agents take place by random chance. At the end of every month,
each agent is paired with another agent of the same group, and they exchange information about the
unit cost of electricity consumed or produced.
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The wind proﬁle, ranging between 0 and 1, was generated by dividing the total consumption
of wind power in Belgium by the population in the year 2018 and multiplying it with two random
values generated around 4.0 m/s (the mean wind speed in Belgium) to introduce randomness in each
quarter hour to depict the uncertainty of wind speed. Two values are generated because the producers
are assumed to be located in two diﬀerent locations. This assumption helps in causing extreme
events in the simulations. The randomness factor is introduced for calculating both the prediction
and actual production; hence, there is always a chance of slight diﬀerence between prediction and
actual production.
The data for solar radiation are generated based on the time of the day and the season of the year,
and a randomness factor is introduced to depict the unpredictability of weather, and, hence, there is
always a chance of a slight diﬀerence between the predicted production and actual production by the
prosumers. The consumption pattern of industries and SMCs is generated by taking into account the
time of the day and the day of the week, whether it is a working day or a weekend. The consumption of
SMCs also has randomness included in the actual production to include unpredictability of consumption
by agents who have no access to information about their predictions and actual consumption.
10. Collectives
Collectives have been deﬁned under the heading of entities, state variables, and scales.
11. bservation
All of the observations are collected for every quarter hour. When it is the observations that
change every month or every three months, the values remain the same for every quarter up to the
point that the agents change their strategy and the value changes. The observations collected from the
model are:
1. Number of industries,
2. Number of RES-E producers,
3. Averaged unitary proﬁt of RES-E producers,
4. Averaged unitary proﬁt of industries,
5. Averaged unitary bill of consumers,
6. Averaged unitary bill of prosumers,
7. Annual DAM price,
8. Annual IM price,
9. Percentage of system consumption from renewables.
Appendix A.3. Initialization
The model is initialized by setting the total number of SMCs (n.SMC) at 4000. This creates two
groups of agents that either have PV panels or not. All SMCs have an average consumption of 0.125
(±0.05) kWh. The total number of industries, n.ind is calculated by dividing n.SMC by 100. The
average consumption (αind) of all industries is set as 2000 (±400) kWh. The industries are randomly
distributed into four groups. The bidding capacities and respective prices for each group have already
been described.
Now, the total required demand of the system, (Δmax.req) can be calculated by summing the average
consumption of all the industries and the SMCs.
The level of τ is also selected from a drop-down lis with the options 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04
from the interface. In addition, from the interface, the percentage of total system demand (Δx) is
selected from a slider with values between 0 and 100%. This provides the information to set the total
number of RES-E producers by dividing the product of Δmax.req and Δx by 500. The RES-E producers
are randomly divided into groups. One group is assigned storage. The respective capacities and costs
for each RES-E group have already been described.
For all RES-E producers, 500 MWh is the average production of a wind turbine considered in
the model.
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Then, the capacity of inﬂexible power production system is 20% of the Δmax.req. Finally, the capacity
of the NG-plant is calculated as 10% of Δmax.req.
Appendix A.4. Input Data
For the data on wind speed, the statistics on wind power production were downloaded from the
website of Belgian Electricity Transmission System Operator, Elia [47]. The data from year 2016 and
2018 were used to calculate the wind speed by using the formula, wind power (kW) = 1/2CpρAV3:
V =Wind speed, m/s,
Cp = 0.59 (theoretical maximum),
ρ = Air density, kg/m3,
A = Rotor swept area, m2 or π D2/4.
The data on wind speed are not meant to depict the exact values but create a realistic pattern of
wind speed in a year for Belgium. The resulting value of wind speed (wind) is then used in every
time step of the model. However, the value w is multiplied with a random variable with mean 4 m/s
(average wind speed of Belgium), to introduce variation in the wind speeds. This value of w is then
used to calculate the production volume of RES-E producers with the formula deﬁned above. The
formula used in the code is (3.14 × (rotor-dia)2 × wind)/2. The value of rotor-dia has been deﬁned as 80
(±20) m.
The data for solar radiation were also generated in the similar manner. The power production
from PV panels was downloaded from Elia’s website for the year 2018, and the solar radiation (H) was
calculated for each quarter of the year by using the formula, solar power (kW) = A × r × H × PR:
A = area of a solar panel (assumed to be 10 m2 on average),
r = solar panel yield (assumed to be 40%),
Performance Ratio (PR) = 0.75 (default value),
H = average quarter hourly solar radiation (kW/m2).
The acquired value of solar irradiation (solar) is then loaded into the model for every quarter and
solar power is calculated by multiplying this value with the capacity of PV panel of the prosumer. The
PV capacity of each prosumer is set as 1 (±0.100) kW.
The consumption pattern of industries was generated to show the higher consumption during the
weekdays and between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., while a maximum consumption of 30% of
average consumption was modeled for the night hours and weekends. For SMCs, the hours in the
morning between 5:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. and hours in the late afternoon between 3:00 p.m. and 7:00
p.m. were modeled to have the highest consumption. Less to almost no consumption was modeled for
early afternoon, later in the evening, and at night.
Appendix B. Results
Table A2. Parameter estimates for the regression models.
Equation (1) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [7.6100895, 8.7469286] 0.28994 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [53.9763258, 55.9404355] 0.50093 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.9897179, 0.6180155] 0.41004 0.65039
(τ0.02) [−0.6306872, 0.9770462] 0.41004 0.67279
(τ0.03) [0.2593658, 1.8670992] 0.41004 0.00954
(τ0.04) [1.5699873, 3.1777207] 0.41004 7.5 × 10−9
(Δx.τ0.01) [−1.3081767, 1.4694938] 0.70843 0.90936
(Δx.τ0.02) [−2.1174333, 0.6602372] 0.70843 0.30378
(Δx.τ0.03) [−1.8649325, 0.9127379] 0.70843 0.50159
(Δx.τ0.04) [9.9443263, 12.7219968] 0.70843 <2 × 10−16
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Table A2. Cont.
Equation (2) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [2.7071620, 3.9960798] 0.3286 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [74.5869387, 81.0400927] 1.6451 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−1.2862439, 0.5365611] 0.4647 0.420
(τ0.02) [−1.1963856, 0.6264195] 0.4647 0.540
(τ0.03) [−0.348558, 1.4742464] 0.4647 0.226
(τ0.04) [−0.4867967, 1.3360083] 0.4647 0.361
(Δx.τ0.01) [−2.7162018, 6.4099361] 2.3265 0.427
(Δx.τ0.02) [−2.2348564, 6.8912815] 2.3265 0.317
(Δx.τ0.03) [−1.8526038, 7.2735342] 2.3265 0.244
(Δx.τ0.04) [15.6178810, 24.7440189] 2.3265 <2 × 10−16
Equation (3) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [14.484822, 16.918209] 0.6205 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [42.828969, 46.291382] 0.8830 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−2.367283, 1.074046] 0.8776 0.461
(τ0.02) [−1.602670, 1.838659] 0.8776 0.893
(τ0.03) [−0.585964, 2.855365] 0.8776 0.196
(τ0.04) [4.022200, 7.463529] 0.8776 6.94 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.01) [−1.777742, 3.118849] 1.2487 0.591
(Δx.τ0.02) [−3.148456, 1.748135] 1.2487 0.575
(Δx.τ0.03) [−3.067230, 1.829361] 1.2487 0.620
(Δx.τ0.04) [4.248845, 9.145436] 1.2487 8.74 × 10−8
Equation (4) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0249092567, 0.0250611015] 3.873 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [0.0131371212, 0.0133994625] 6.691 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.0007381475, −0.0005234065] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.02) [−0.0013410582, −0.0011263171] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.03) [−0.0020040095, −0.0017892684] 5.477 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.04) [−0.0023555315, −0.0021407904] 5.47 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.01) [−0.0035230511, −0.0031520444] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.02) [−0.0068965095, −0.0065255028] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.03) [−0.0102137379, −0.0098427312] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.04) [−0.0141593139, −0.0137883072] 9.462 × 10−5 <2 × 10−16
Equation (5) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0249092567, 0.0250611015] 0.0002107 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [0.0131371212, 0.0133994625] 0.0003641 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.0007381475, −0.0005234065] 0.0002980 0.160095
(τ0.02) [−0.0013410582, −0.0011263171] 0.0002980 0.002045
(τ0.03) [−0.0020040095, −0.0017892684] 0.0002980 0.000215
(τ0.04) [−0.0023555315, −0.0021407904] 0.0002980 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.01) [−0.0035230511, −0.0031520444] 0.0005149 0.049849
(Δx.τ0.02) [−0.0068965095, −0.0065255028] 0.0005149 3.79 × 10−5
(Δx.τ0.03) [−0.0102137379, −0.0098427312] 0.0005149 1.88 × 10−11
(Δx.τ0.04) [−0.0141593139, −0.0137883072] 0.0005149 <2 × 10−16
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Table A2. Cont.
Equation (6) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.0009089505, 1.518687 × 10−3] 1.554 × 10−4 1.20 × 10−14
(Δx) [0.0009249548, 5.236665 × 10−3] 1.099 × 10−3 0.00513
(τ0.01) [−0.0005317846, 3.305135 × 10−4] 2.198 × 10−4 0.64709
(τ0.02) [−0.0004843669, 3.779311 × 10−4] 2.198 × 10−4 0.80870
(τ0.03) [−0.0007923893, 6.990876 × 10−5] 2.198 × 10−4 0.10048
(τ0.04) [0.0023973214, 3.259619 × 10−3] 2.198 × 10−4 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.01) [−0.0056389054, 4.587736 × 10−4] 1.554 × 10−3 0.09583
(Δx.τ0.02) [−0.0094620968, −3.364418 × 10−3] 1.554 × 10−3 3.92 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.03) [−0.0105595729, −4.461894 × 10−43] 1.554 × 10−3 1.51 × 10−6
(Δx.τ0.04) [0.0083587361, 1.445642 × 10−2] 1.554 × 10−3 3.84 × 10−13
Equation (7) 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Standard Error p-Values
Intercept [0.009186941, 0.0106329549] 0.0003688 <2 × 10−16
(Δx) [−0.035489722, −0.0333098310] 0.0005559 <2 × 10−16
(τ0.01) [−0.001799072, 0.0002459000] 0.0005215 0.136548
(τ0.02) [−0.002920207, −0.0008752344] 0.0005215 0.000278
(τ0.03) [−0.002860245, −0.0008152728] 0.0005215 0.000430
(τ0.04) [0.003440509, 0.0054854812] 0.0005215 <2 × 10−16
(Δx.τ0.01) [−0.002047464, 0.0010353664] 0.0007862 0.519831
(Δx.τ0.02) [−0.002286895, 0.0007959363] 0.0007862 0.343084
(Δx.τ0.03) [−0.003969384, −0.0008865529] 0.0007862 0.002028
(Δx.τ0.04) [0.006221606, 0.0093044372] 0.0007862 <2 × 10−16
References
1. European Commission. Renewable Energy Statistics—Eurostat Statistics Explained. Available online:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics (accessed on 3 June
2019).
2. European Commission. Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December
2018 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources; European Commission: Brussels, Belgium,
2018.
3. WindEurope.org. Wind Energy in Europe in 2018. Available online: https://windeurope.org/wp-content/
uploads/ﬁles/about-wind/statistics/WindEurope-Annual-Statistics-2018.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2019).
4. Fanone, E.; Gamba, A.; Prokopczuk, M. The case of negative day-ahead electricity prices. Energy Econ. 2013,
35, 22–34. [CrossRef]
5. Brandstätt, C.; Brunekreeft, G.; Jahnke, K. How to deal with negative power price spikes?—Flexible voluntary
curtailment agreements for large-scale integration of wind. Energy Policy 2011, 39, 3732–3740. [CrossRef]
6. De Vos, K. Negative Wholesale Electricity Prices in the German, French and Belgian Day-Ahead, Intra-Day
and Real-Time Markets. Electr. J. 2015, 28, 36–50. [CrossRef]
7. Lund, P.D. Eﬀects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable energy. Renew. Energy 2009, 34,
53–64. [CrossRef]
8. Peak Gen Power. Available online: https://www.peakgen.com/ (accessed on 5 August 2019).
9. WindEurope.org. Making Transition Work; WindEurope: Brussels, Belgium, 2016.
10. Kim, J.-H.; Shcherbakova, A. Common failures of demand response. Energy 2011, 36, 873–880. [CrossRef]
11. Paulus, M.; Borggrefe, F. The potential of demand-side management in energy-intensive industries for
electricity markets in Germany. Appl. Energy 2011, 88, 432–441. [CrossRef]
12. Qadrdan, M.; Cheng, M.; Wu, J.; Jenkins, N. Beneﬁts of demand-side response in combined gas and electricity
networks. Appl. Energy 2017, 192, 360–369. [CrossRef]
13. National Grid ESO. Power Responsive Steering Group by National Grid Electricity System Operator; and
the Environmental Charity Sustainability First. In Power Responsive: Demand Side Flexibility; Annual Report;
National Grid ESO: Gallows Hill, UK, 2018.
293
Energies 2019, 12, 4314
14. Li, G.; Shi, J. Agent-based modeling for trading wind power with uncertainty in the day-ahead wholesale
electricity markets of single-sided auctions. Appl. Energy 2012, 99, 13–22. [CrossRef]
15. Sopha, B.M.; Klöckner, C.A.; Hertwich, E.G. Adoption and diﬀusion of heating systems in Norway: Coupling
agent-based modeling with empirical research. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 2013, 8, 42–61. [CrossRef]
16. Schramm, M.E.; Trainor, K.J.; Shanker, M.; Hu, M.Y. An agent-based diﬀusion model with consumer and
brand agents. Decis. Support Syst. 2010, 50, 234–242. [CrossRef]
17. Van Dam, K.H.; Nikolic, I.; Lukszo, Z. (Eds.) Agent-Based Modelling of Socio-Technical Systems; Springer Science
& Business Media: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2012; Volume 9.
18. Bellekom, S.; Arentsen, M.; van Gorkum, K. Prosumption and the distribution and supply of electricity.
Energy Sustain. Soc. 2016, 6, 22. [CrossRef]
19. Fichera, A.; Pluchino, A.; Volpe, R. A multi-layer agent-based model for the analysis of energy distribution
networks in urban areas. Phys. A Stat. Mech. Appl. 2018, 508, 710–725. [CrossRef]
20. Misra, S.; Bera, S.; Ojha, T.; Zhou, L. Entice: Agent-based energy trading with incomplete information in the
smart grid. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 2015, 55, 202–212. [CrossRef]
21. North, M.; Conzelmann, G.; Koritarov, V.; Macal, C.; Thimmapuram, P.; Veselka, T. E-Laboratories: Agent-Based
Modeling of Electricity Markets; Argonne National Lab.: Lemont, IL, USA, 2002.
22. Vasirani, M.; Kota, R.; Cavalcante, R.L.G.; Ossowski, S.; Jennings, N.R. An Agent-Based Approach to Virtual
Power Plants of Wind Power Generators and Electric Vehicles. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 2013, 4, 1314–1322.
[CrossRef]
23. Lund, P.D.; Lindgren, J.; Mikkola, J.; Salpakari, J. Review of energy system ﬂexibility measures to enable high
levels of variable renewable electricity. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2015, 45, 785–807. [CrossRef]
24. Elia. The Day-Ahead Hub: A Platform at the Centre of ARPs Activities; Elia: Brussels, Belgium, 2012.
25. Balancing Mechanism—Elia. Available online: https://www.elia.be/en/products-and-services/balance/
balancing-mechanism (accessed on 6 August 2019).
26. Meyer, N.I. European schemes for promoting renewables in liberalised markets. Energy Policy 2003, 31,
665–676. [CrossRef]
27. Menanteau, P.; Finon, D.; Lamy, M.-L. Prices versus quantities: Choosing policies for promoting the
development of renewable energy. Energy Policy 2003, 31, 799–812. [CrossRef]
28. Verhaegen, K.; Meeus, L.; Belmans, R. Towards an international tradable green certiﬁcate system—The
challenging example of Belgium. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2009, 13, 208–215. [CrossRef]
29. World Nuclear News. Belgium Maintains Nuclear Phase-Out Policy. Available online: https://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/Articles/Belgium-maintains-nuclear-phase-out-policy (accessed on 8 Novmber 2019).
30. Flemish Green Power Certiﬁcates (GSC)|Agency Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Available online: https:
//www.vlaio.be/nl/subsidies-ﬁnanciering/subsidiedatabank/vlaamse-groenestroomcertiﬁcaten-gsc (accessed
on 10 December 2018).
31. Generating Facilities. Available online: https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/power-generation/generating-
facilities (accessed on 8 November 2019).
32. Shum, K.L. Renewable energy deployment policy: A transition management perspective. Renew. Sustain.
Energy Rev. 2017, 73, 1380–1388. [CrossRef]
33. Ashok, S.; Banerjee, R. Load-management applications for the industrial sector. Appl. Energy 2000, 66,
105–111. [CrossRef]
34. Baker, P. Beneﬁting Customers while Compensating Suppliers: Getting Supplier Compensation Right; The Regulatory
Assistance Project (RAP): Brussels, Belgium, 2016.
35. Grimm, V.; Berger, U.; DeAngelis, D.L.; Polhill, J.G.; Giske, J.; Railsback, S.F. The ODD protocol: A review
and ﬁrst update. Ecol. Model. 2010, 221, 2760–2768. [CrossRef]
36. Wilensky, U. Netlogo; Northwestern University Evanston: Evanston, IL, USA, 1999.
37. Grimm, V.; Berger, U.; Bastiansen, F.; Eliassen, S.; Ginot, V.; Giske, J.; Goss-Custard, J.; Grand, T.; Heinz, S.K.;
Huse, G.; et al. A standard protocol for describing individual-based and agent-based models. Ecol. Model.
2006, 198, 115–126. [CrossRef]
38. Borggrefe, F.; Neuhoﬀ, K. Balancing and Intraday Market Design: Options for Wind Integration; DIW Discussion
Papers; German Institute for Economic Research: Berlin, Germany, 2011.
39. IRENA. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017; International Renewable Energy Agency: Abu Dhabi, UAE,
2018; p. 160.
294
Energies 2019, 12, 4314
40. Kost, C.; Shammugam, S.; Jülch, V.; Nguyen, H.-T.; Schlegl, T. Levelized Cost of Electricity—Renewable Energy
Technologies; Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE: Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, 2013.
41. Mulder, G.; Six, D.; Claessens, B.; Broes, T.; Omar, N.; Mierlo, J.V. The dimensioning of PV-battery systems
depending on the incentive and selling price conditions. Appl. Energy 2013, 111, 1126–1135. [CrossRef]
42. IRENA. Renewable Energy Prospects: 2014; International Renewable Energy Agency: Abu Dhabi, UAE, 2014.
43. Masson, G.; Neubourg, G. PV Prosumer Guidelines Belgium; Becquerel Institute: Brussels, Belgium, 2019; p. 8.
44. Alberici, S. Subsidies and Costs of EU Energy (Annex 4–5); Ecofys: Berlin, Germany, 2014.
45. Government of Flanders Screen Flanders—Climate and Weather. Available online: https://www.
screenﬂanders.be/en/ﬁlm-commission/production-guide/facts-and-ﬁgures/climate-and-weather (accessed
on 9 October 2019).
46. Team, F. The Potential Role of H2 Production in a Sustainable Future Power System. Available online: https:
//ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/potential-role-h2-production-sustainable-future-power-system (accessed
on 21 October 2019).
47. About Elia—Elia. Available online: http://www.elia.be/en/about-elia (accessed on 16 May 2019).
48. R Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing; R Foundation for Statistical Computing:
Vienna, Austria, 2013.
49. Cludius, J.; Hermann, H.; Matthes, F.C.; Graichen, V. The merit order eﬀect of wind and photovoltaic
electricity generation in Germany 2008–2016: Estimation and distributional implications. Energy Econ. 2014,
44, 302–313. [CrossRef]
50. De Vos, K.; Petoussis, A.G.; Driesen, J.; Belmans, R. Revision of reserve requirements following wind power
integration in island power systems. Renew. Energy 2013, 50, 268–279. [CrossRef]
51. Kondoh, J.; Ishii, I.; Yamaguchi, H.; Murata, A.; Otani, K.; Sakuta, K.; Higuchi, N.; Sekine, S.; Kamimoto, M.
Electrical energy storage systems for energy networks. Energy Convers. Manag. 2000, 41, 1863–1874.
[CrossRef]
52. Zhao, H.; Wu, Q.; Hu, S.; Xu, H.; Rasmussen, C.N. Review of energy storage system for wind power
integration support. Appl. Energy 2015, 137, 545–553. [CrossRef]
53. McDowall, J. Integrating energy storage with wind power in weak electricity grids. J. Power Sources 2006,
162, 959–964. [CrossRef]
54. Frondel, M.; Sommer, S.; Vance, C. The burden of Germany’s energy transition: An empirical analysis of
distributional eﬀects. Econ. Anal. Policy 2015, 45, 89–99. [CrossRef]
55. Winkler, J.; Altmann, M. Market Designs for a Completely Renewable Power Sector. Z. Energ. 2012, 36, 77–92.
[CrossRef]
56. Zwaenepoel, B.; Vansteenbrugge, J.; Vandoorn, T.L.; Van Eetvelde, G.; Vandevelde, L. Ancillary services for
the electrical grid by waste heat. Appl. Therm. Eng. 2014, 70, 1156–1161. [CrossRef]
57. Verzijlbergh, R.A.; De Vries, L.J.; Dijkema, G.P.J.; Herder, P.M. Institutional challenges caused by the
integration of renewable energy sources in the European electricity sector. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2017,
75, 660–667. [CrossRef]
58. Kikuchi, Y.; Kanematsu, Y.; Ugo, M.; Hamada, Y.; Okubo, T. Industrial Symbiosis Centered on a Regional
Cogeneration Power Plant Utilizing Available Local Resources: A Case Study of Tanegashima. J. Ind. Ecol.
2016, 20, 276–288. [CrossRef]
59. Rogers, E.M. Diﬀusion of Innovations, 4th ed.; Simon and Schuster: New York, NY, USA, 2010; ISBN
978-1-4516-0247-0.
60. Larsen, J.K. Available online: https://studylib.net/doc/7736725/rocky-mountain-power-decision-summary-
report-on-purpa-time (accessed on 8 November 2019).
61. Joos,M.; Staﬀell, I. Short-term integration costs of variable renewable energy: Wind curtailment and balancing
in Britain and Germany. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2018, 86, 45–65. [CrossRef]
62. Wilson, M. Available online: https://www.lazard.com/media/450774/lazards-levelized-cost-of-storage-
version-40-vﬁnal.pdf (accessed on 8 November 2019).
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
295
